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INTRODUCTION 
There has been much literature written on the subject of clickstream data.1  
However, very little has been discussed over the extent to which clickstream 
data is considered as “personal data” under European and U.S. law.2  This 
Article considers the current European Union (EU) regulations governing 
clickstream data by examining the European Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC (DPD)3 and the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC (DPEC),4 comparing these laws with the U.S. 
legal framework.  In particular, this Article discusses the broad application of 
the DPD under Article 4 and the notion of “personal data” as defined under 
Article 2(a).5  The implications of the DPD should not be underestimated 
because the DPD can have overreaching effects by applying to companies or 
organizations operating outside the European Economic Area (“EEA”), 
principally through Article 4(1)(c).6  In addition, this Article surveys the 
applicable clickstream statutory regulatory frameworks by reviewing Title III 
of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Wiretap Act”) and 
its progeny.7  This Article takes a critical approach to clickstream data by 
 
 
1
 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 23–24 (2004) (discussing the practice of websites 
that collect personal information from users, enabling them to target their advertising); Lee Kovarsky, Tolls on 
the Information Superhighway: Entitlement Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89 VA. L. REV. 1037, 1070–1978 
(2003) (discussing the lack of statutory remedies to redress the injury caused by companies invading personal 
privacy); Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 66–67 (2000) (stating that companies compile personal data to obtain 
information about consumer preferences).  
 
2
 See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS 
316–18 (2002) (stating that the EC Directive and other data protection laws do not conclusively define what is 
considered ‘personal data’ in clickstream data).  
 
3
 Council Directive 95/46/EC, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter DPD]. 
 
4
 Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002 O.J. (L 
201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter DPEC]. 
 
5
 Article 2(a) defines personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular 
by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”  DPD, supra note 3, art. 2. 
 
6
 Id. art. 4(1)(c); see also BYGRAVE, supra note 2, at 14 (stating that instruments such as the EC 
Directive are significant because they shape the data protection laws of many different jurisdictions). 
 
7
 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 amended Title III to extend its wire tap restrictions over telephone communications to include 
communications transmitted by electronic data.  See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
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considering the current EU and U.S. regulatory frameworks for clickstream 
data and by analyzing the extent to which such data is protected. 
I. WHAT IS CLICKSTEAM DATA? 
The first question is what is clickstream data?8  Clickstream data is defined 
as “the generic name given to the information a website can know about a user 
simply because the user has browsed the site.”9  Clickstream data is compiled 
from cookie based technology,10 which websites began using in the mid-
1990s.11  Cookies are information packets transmitted from a server to an end-
user’s web browser and that are then retransmitted back to the server each time 
the browser accesses a server’s webpage.12  Cookies store information used for 
authentication, identification, or registration of an end-user to a web site, 
thereby enabling the end-user’s web browser to maintain a relationship 
between the server and the end-user.13 The use of cookie based technology 
enables companies to deliver user-specific solutions for each machine that 
accesses their web pages by placing electronic markers on end-user 
 
 
8
 Portions of this section have been substantially reprinted from Daniel B. Garrie, The Legal Status of 
Software, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 711, 732–35 (2005) [hereinafter Garrie, Legal Status] and 
Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald. P. Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap 
Act: Is Your Conversation Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 108–11 (2005) [hereinafter Garrie, Voice 
Over].    
 
9
 Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1085, 1104 (2002).  This information includes a user’s detailed browsing activity and TCP/IP address, which 
can be used to discover personal information about the user.  Id.  Once a user has accessed a website that uses 
cookie technology or an affiliated site, the embedded cookie on the hard drive begins collecting data about the 
user’s web activities.  Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 2001).  There are 
three reported cases in which cookie technology was used by a website to mine personal information from the 
user’s machine: Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1155, In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), and In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 
10
 Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 1045–46. 
 
11
 See In re DoubleClick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03 (“Cookies are computer programs commonly 
used by Web sites to store useful information . . . .”). 
 
12
 See Rachel K. Zimmerman, Note, The Way the “Cookies” Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data 
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUBL. POL’Y 439, 440 (2000–2001). 
 
13
 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1458–60 (2001); Lawrence Jenab, Comment, Will the Cookie 
Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th Congress, 49 KAN. L. 
REV. 641, 667–68 (2001); Zimmerman, supra note 12. 
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machines.14  Collectively these cookie-driven markers create a trail of 
information commonly referred to as “clickstream data.”15 
Clickstream data and cookies can be found in most Internet driven 
commerce contexts, including those involving the employer-employee 
workplace and the Internet Service Provider (ISP)/online company and its 
users, particularly in the context of interactive marketing. 
In its infancy, clickstream data was used to garner basic information from a 
web user,16 such as the type of computer an individual used to access the 
Internet, the type of Internet browser utilized, or the identification of each site 
or page visited.17 
As technology evolved, however, so did the scope of data encompassed by 
clickstream data.18  For instance, today, when an individual discloses certain 
information during a visit to a website via his or her Personal Digital Assistant, 
cell phone, Blackberry, laptop computer, iPod, or desktop computer, it is 
possible that the website will be collecting clickstream data of a much more 
personal nature.19  Clickstream data is used in part because web server 
technologies cannot store, sort, and render to a user the vast amounts of data 
required to deliver the respective web solutions to each individual user to a site 
or to authenticate a user.20  Thus, such websites can off-load information to the 
 
 
14
 See Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 NOVA L. 
REV. 551, 554 (1999).   
 
15
 Once a user has accessed a web site that uses cookie technology or an affiliated site, the embedded 
cookie on the hard drive begins collecting data about the user’s web activities.   
 
16
 See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 14, at 559 (noting that cookies were designed for the benign 
purpose of enabling websites to recognize repeat visitors). 
 
17
 See Karen Dearne, You are Being Monitored Online, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 24, 2002, at 31; Fusun 
Feride Gonul, Stereotyping Bites the Dust; Marketers No Longer Focusing On Demographic Profiling, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE (Pa.), Feb. 26, 2002, at B3. 
 
18
 See Lin, supra note 9, at 1104–05 (defining clickstream data as a trail of information that a user leaves 
behind while browsing on the Web); see generally Jane Kaufman Winn & James R. Wrathall, Who Owns the 
Consumer? The Emerging Law of Commercial Transactions in Electronic Customer Data, 56 BUS. LAW. 213, 
234–35 (2000) (stating that the use of cookies is no longer limited to tracking movements on a single website, 
but has expanded to tracking site to site movement); Herbert A. Edelstein, Pan for Gold in the Clickstream, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, Mar. 12, 2001, at 77 (stating that by analyzing the tracks people make through a 
company’s website, the company is able to retrieve information about their customers’ purchasing habits). 
 
19
 See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (information collected by 
defendant included email addresses, insurance statuses, education levels, medical conditions, and other 
sensitive information stored by computers). 
 
20
 See generally R. A. MOELLER, DISTRIBUTED DATA WAREHOUSING USING WEB TECHNOLOGY: HOW TO 
BUILD A MORE COST-EFFECTIVE AND FLEXIBLE WAREHOUSE (2001). 
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user’s device where it is stored in text files called “cookies.”21  These cookies 
provide the website a mechanism that is able to collect or store data on the 
user’s machine,22  thereby enabling the web site to record, track, monitor, and 
deliver dynamic content reflective of the data points stored on their machine.23 
The data mining industry and a majority of web portals and Internet 
companies would be severely limited, if not rendered useless, in the absence of 
clickstream data.24  Internet companies currently rely heavily on tracking 
clickstream data to profile user preferences in order to deliver customized 
services and advertisements to Internet users.25  Although it is possible for 
authentication processes to occur in a different manner, by requiring the users 
to affirmatively consent to monitoring of clickstream data, it is highly unlikely 
that fully informed end-users26 would interact with sites that track, monitor, 
and traffic in their personally identifiable information.27 
A. Employer/Employee Workplace 
1. Europe 
Software exists such that employers may monitor the web pages visited and 
Internet transactions executed by their employees.28  Although the employer 
has unchecked monitoring privileges in the United States, any covert 
 
 
21
 See MICHAEL J. A. BERRY & GORDON LINOFF, MASTERING DATA MINING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF 
CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 479–80 (2000); Colin Shearer, The CRISP-DM Model: The New 
Blueprint for Data Mining, 5 J. DATA WAREHOUSING 4, 13–22 (2000). 
 
22
 Once a user has accessed a web site that uses cookie technology or an affiliated site, the embedded 
cookie on the hard drive begins collecting data about the user’s web activities.  See Berman & Mulligan, supra 
note 14, at 559.  
 
23
 Jenab, supra note 13, at 645. 
 
24
 Elimination of clickstream data or cookies would impact such websites as: www.yahoo.com; 
www.google.com; www.wamu.com; www.schwab.com; www.ibm.com.  Adjoining these web sites are a slew 
of Internet and web applications that utilize cookies and clickstream data for authentication.  Elimination 
would impact not only businesses but also a large number of government enabled web applications.  See The 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Guidelines for Federal and ACT Government Websites, 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/internet/web/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (providing guidance for the many 
government sites that use cookies and clickstream data technology). 
 
25
 See In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see 
generally BERRY & LINOFF, supra note 15; Zimmerman, supra note 12. 
 
26
 See generally Alan F. Blakley, Privacy: The Delicate Entanglement of Self and Other, 3 RUTGERS J.L. 
& URB. POL’Y 172, 172–79 (2006).  
 
27
 Edelstein, supra note 18, at 85. 
 
28
 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 18–19 (1999); see generally Julie E. 
Cohen, Privacy, Ideology and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029 (2001) (discussing 
employer-employee monitoring in cyberspace). 
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monitoring by an employer would potentially violate the national data 
protection laws in Europe, unless employees have consented to such use.29  In 
the context of European data protection law, it is arguable that employees 
consent reluctantly to their employer monitoring their online behavior in the 
economic interest of the company.  As Lee Kovarsky has stated: 
That employers may monitor email and web surfing to promote 
productivity and protect against industrial espionage has become 
more of a fact of life than a controversy and employers would likely 
contract around any default rule to the contrary.30 
Taking an alternative view on employee monitoring, the Article 29 Working 
Party, an independent advisory body tasked to provide opinions on the DPD 
and the DPEC, has issued some guidelines on the surveillance of electronic 
communications in the workplace.31  These guidelines aim to “contribute to the 
uniform application of the national measures adopted under the [DPD]” in 
surveillance and monitoring of electronic communications in the workplace.32 
The Working Party has taken the view that prevention should be more 
important than detection and that the interest of the employer is better served in 
preventing Internet misuse, rather than detecting such misuse.33 
These guidelines have been found to emphasize the following principles 
when monitoring e-mail and Internet use of employees within the borders of 
the EU: 
 Principle of necessity—the monitoring in question must be necessary for 
a specified purpose and should not be used if there are any less intrusive 
methods.34 
 Principle of finality—data must be collected for a specified, explicit, and 
legitimate purpose and not further processed in a way incompatible with 
those purposes. 
 
 
29
 The Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
Working Document on the Surveillance of Electronic Communications in the Workplace, 26, 
5401/01/EN/Final, WP 55 (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter Surveillance of Electronic Communications], available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp55_en.pdf; see also Donald P. Harris, 
Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. Armstrong, Sexual Harassment: Limiting the Affirmative Defense in the Digital 
Workplace, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 73, 83–87 (2005). 
 
30
 Kovarsky, supra note 1, at 1043. 
 
31
 See generally Surveillance of Electronic Communications, supra note 29, at 26. 
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 Id. at 4. 
 
34
 Id. at 13. 
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 Principle of transparency—the employer must be clear and open about 
his activities.  Unless covert monitoring falls within the exemptions laid 
down under Article 1335 of the DPD, such monitoring should not be 
permitted.  This principle may also include the obligation to notify the 
relevant data protection authorities before personal data is processed. 
 Obligation to provide information about the data subject—in particular, 
workers should be provided with a readily accessible, clear, and accurate 
statement of the company’s policy on e-mail and Internet monitoring.  
Data subjects also have the right to access the personal data processed 
by his or her employer. 
 Principle of legitimacy—in accordance with Article 7 of the DPD, or 
data protection laws transposing this provision, processing of personal 
data can only take place if it has a legitimate purpose. 
 Principle of proportionality—personal data must be adequate, relevant, 
and not excessive with regard to achieving the purpose specified.  In 
other words, the monitoring must be proportional to the risks entailed by 
the employer. 
 Accuracy and retention of data—data stored by an employer consisting 
of data from or related to a worker’s e-mail account or the worker’s use 
of the Internet must be accurate and kept up to date and not kept for 
longer than necessary. 
 Security—in accordance with Article 17 of DPD, employers should 
ensure that appropriate technical and organizational measures are in 
place to ensure that any personal data held by the employer is secure and 
safe from outside intrusion.36 
Whilst these principles are helpful in guiding the employers over the general 
application of e-mail and Internet monitoring, employers and employees 
should nevertheless be educated about the collection of clickstream data and 
the ways in which it is used. 
2. U.S. Law 
The United States’ courts have recognized an employer’s right to monitor 
employees’ e-mail messages and to use digital technologies to protect trade 
 
 
35
 Exemptions provided under Article 13 of the DPD included the following areas: national security; 
defence; public security; the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of 
breaches of ethics for regulated professions; and the protection of the data subjects or of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  Id. at 14 n.15.  
 
36
 Id. at 13–18. 
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secrets.37  The U.S. courts have found employees do not have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy when their employer has an e-mail policy 
informing them that their e-mail or Internet use may be monitored.38  For 
instance, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Simons recognized that the 
employee has no expectation of privacy in clickstream data.39  Essentially, U.S. 
courts have reasoned employers have the right to invade employees’ digital 
work spaces because employers have legitimate interests in all 
communications transmitted on their digital networks.40 
In monitoring employees, the vast majority of large employers use digital 
tracking technology.41  Recently, the Washington Internet Daily released a 
survey finding that eighty percent of major U.S. companies record and review 
their employees’ electronic communications or browser use.42  Sixty-seven 
percent of employers have disciplined at least one employee for improper or 
excessive use of e-mail or Internet access; thirty-one percent have fired 
employees for such conduct.43  A recent survey found that more than three-
quarters of major U.S. corporations monitor employee activities, including 
telephone calls, e-mail, Internet communications, and computer files.44  In 
addition to the employer’s ability to monitor employee digital transmissions, 
employers may possess a high degree of control over employee computer 
desktops.45 Employer control helps employee productivity by ensuring that a 
uniform technical environment exists.46 
 
 
37
 See Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 551–52 (N.J. 2000); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 169 (2000). 
 
38
 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 409 (2d Cir. 2004); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 
Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002); Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
 
39
 United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Skok, supra note 1, at 80–81. 
 
40
 See Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the abuse of access to 
workplace computers is so common that “reserving a right of inspection is so far from being unreasonable that 
the failure to do so might well be thought irresponsible”). 
 
41
 Employers Fighting Net Abuse Must Mind Privacy, WASHINGTON INTERNET DAILY, Apr. 24, 2002, 
http://www.wrf.com/media_news.cfm?sp=news&tp=&industry_id=0&practice_ID=0&ID=2037. 
 
42
 Id. 
 
43
 Id. 
 
44
 AM. MGMT. ASS’N, 2001 AMA SURVEY: WORKPLACE MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE: SUMMARY OF 
KEY FINDINGS (2001), available at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/ems_short2001.pdf. 
 
45
 See generally Michelle Delio, New Tools a Spying Boss Will Love, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 13, 2002, 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,56324,00.html (explaining employer techniques to minimize 
employee misuse of technology). 
 
46
 See generally id. 
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Because of this judicially recognized expectation of diminished privacy in 
the workplace,47 employees are only entitled to bring suit when an intrusion 
infringes upon intensely private matters or when the employer has failed to 
inform the employee of the monitoring.48  The combined actions of the U.S. 
Congress and the courts have effectively expanded an employer’s ability to 
monitor employee electronic communications without violating federal privacy 
laws.49 
B. ISP/Online Company and the User 
1. Europe 
The responsibilities of the ISP’s and online companies to Internet users can 
be examined by differentiating between the ISP and the online advertising 
company.  In both contexts, the collection of the user’s personal information 
should be in accordance with the data protection principles as laid down under 
Article 6 of the DPD or its corresponding laws on data protection.50  Article 6 
of the DPD provides that Member States should ensure that personal data are: 
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. 
Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific 
purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that 
Member States provide appropriate safeguards; 
 
 
47
 See generally Blakely, supra note 26, at 179 (providing evidence of the foundation of this view, which 
is rooted in the ancient Greek belief that privacy coexists with the public realm). 
 
48
 See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D. Ariz. 
1998); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding employer may have 
intruded on an employee’s privacy by reading personal medical documents on employee’s desk). 
 
49
 See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that email messages 
stored on ISP servers fall within the definition of “electronic storage” under the Stored Communications Act); 
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that the employer’s search 
of an email system was permitted); United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the professor, who had entered a conditional plea for downloading child pornography to his 
workplace computer, had no expectation of privacy in his use of his public employer’s computer because the 
university’s usage and monitoring policy was displayed upon login); United States v. Bunnell, No. CRIM.02-
13-B-S, 2002 WL 981457, at *2 (D. Me. May 10, 2002) (stating a public university “student has no generic 
expectation of privacy for shared usage on the university’s computers” (citing United States v. Butler, 151 F. 
Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D. Me. 2001))). 
 
50
 See also European Commission. Status of implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/ 
privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). 
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(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes 
for which they are collected and/or further processed; 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every 
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are 
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for 
which they were collected or for which they are further 
processed, are erased or rectified; 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for 
no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data 
were collected or for which they are further processed. Member 
States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data 
stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific 
use.
51
 
Gavin Skok aptly described the differences between an online advertiser and 
the ISP as follows: 
Some online advertisers have developed “networks” of hundreds of 
unrelated Web sites which use individual identifying codes to 
identify and track Web users’ clickstreams as they travel among the 
sites on the network.  The data compiled by these businesses is then 
“mined” for hints about consumer preferences. . . .  In contrast, ISPs 
can precisely monitor and record an entire clickstream since all of the 
user’s [sic] online commands are sent through the ISP.52 
The DPD considers an ISP to be a data controller because an ISP has access to 
the user’s Internet provider (IP) address and clickstream data.53  However, 
even when an IP address and clickstream data are combined with other 
information that a user has voluntarily provided, such as a postal address, ISPs 
generally must still adhere to the DPD.54   
 An ISP may possibly collect an individual’s personal data in its role as a 
third party facilitator.55  Under those circumstances, an ISP would be regarded 
as a data processor under Article 2(e) of the DPD,56 unless the ISP “alone or 
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing,” in 
which case the ISP would be regarded as a data controller under Article 2(d) of 
the DPD.57  This distinction is important because the DPD places significant 
 
 
51
 Id.  
 
52
 Skok, supra note 1, at 66–67. 
 
53
 See DPD, supra note 3, art. 2. 
 
54
 See id. art. 3. 
 
55
 See id. art. 2(e). 
 
56
 See id.  
 
57
 See id. art. 2(d). 
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obligations on data controllers who process personal data.58  For example, data 
controllers must comply with the data protection principles under Article 6 of 
the DPD and compensate the data subject for damage caused by the unlawful 
processing of personal data under Article 23 of the DPD.59  To summarize, 
online advertisers and ISPs that collect clickstream data qualify as “data 
controllers” under Article 2(d) of the DPD because they are collecting an 
individual’s personal data and therefore must comply with the relevant data 
protection laws that apply.60 
2. U.S. Law 
To some degree, U.S. law parallels its European counterpart by 
distinguishing ISPs from online advertising companies.61  However, it differs 
notably because unlike the DPD, the U.S. regulatory frameworks do not define 
personal data.62  As such, the sub-set of personal data is unprotected as well.63  
U.S. law is further complicated because the regulatory framework language64 
does not differentiate between written and oral digital communications.65  
Under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA)66 a government 
official that seeks to intercept or obtain electronic communications, such as 
ISP logs, must obtain judicial authorization by way of a “Title III” order from a 
federal judge.67  Although the ECPA has been amended by the U.S.A. Patriot 
Act, the concept requiring the government to make some showing to a federal 
judge is true in most instances.68  In summary, the United States lacks explicit 
comprehensive digital privacy legislation.  Furthermore, the definition of 
 
 
58
 See generally id. arts. 6, 23. 
 
59
 See generally id. 
 
60
 The subject of clickstream data as “personal data” is discussed further in Part III. 
 
61
 See Garrie, Voice Over, supra note 8, at 115.   
 
62
 See generally id. 
 
63
 See generally id. 
 
64
 See generally David Bender & Larry Ponemon, Binding Corporate Rules for Cross-Border Data 
Transfer, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 154, 155–59 (2006). 
 
65
 See generally Garrie, Voice Over, supra note 8.   
 
66
 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) 
(codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)). 
 
67
 Id. § 2516. 
 
68
 The scope and impact of the U.S.A. Patriot Act is beyond the scope of this article.  For further 
discussion of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, see John P. Elwood, Prosecuting the War on Terrorism: The 
Government’s Position on Attorney-Client Monitoring, Detainees, and Military Tribunals, 17 CRIM. JUST. 30, 
51 (2002). 
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personal data is discussed, applied, and defined only in select areas, such as 
medical privacy.69 
In the context of clickstream data, the degree of liability for a specific ISP 
hinges on the role the ISP is playing with respect to the clickstream data 
collection.  If the ISP’s role is that of a third party, the ISP is immune from 
liability for its role in collecting the clickstream data and for most third party 
acts because of section 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA).70  The 
CDA provides that ISPs are not publishers or speakers of information provided 
by a third party entity, a stipulation that effectively grants immunity to the 
ISP.71  Therefore, in the context of clickstream data, the CDA effectively 
immunizes the ISP from liability, so long as it is a third party performing the 
data collection.72  In cases in which an ISP itself is collecting clickstream data 
of end-users, the ISP may be found liable depending on the manner and type of 
consent that it acquired of the end-user.73 
II. EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE PROTECTION OF 
CLICKSTREAM DATA 
A. Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
The DPD was passed in 1995 with the aim of harmonizing the data 
protection laws within the EU.74  An EU directive is binding on the Member 
State to which is it is addressed; however, the Member States decide on the 
form and methods in which to transpose the directive.  To date, all the Member 
States, including the accession states that have joined the EU in 2004, have 
 
 
69
 See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (D. Ariz. 
1998); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding employer may have 
intruded on an employee’s privacy by reading personal medical documents on employee’s desk). 
 
70
 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 
71
 See id. § 230(c)(1). 
 
72
 See id. 
 
73
 See Alan F. Blakley, Daniel B. Garrie & Mathew J. Armstrong, Coddling Spies: Why the Law Doesn’t 
Adequately Address Computer Spyware, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 25, 31–32.  For a discussion of how the 
U.S. courts have interpreted the permissible range of collection of clickstream data by corporate entities, see 
Part IV.  
 
74
 See generally DPD, supra note 3, pmbl.  Two main international developments influenced the DPD.  
These were the OECD Guidelines in 1980 and the Council of Europe Convention in 1981, which developed 
guidelines involving the processing of personal data.  Sweden was the first country to introduce data protection 
laws in the 1970s, but the harmonization of data protection laws within the EU did not occur until 1995.  For 
further reading see ROSEMARY JAY & ANGUS HAMILTON, DATA PROTECTION: LAW AND PRACTICE 4–6 (1999), 
and CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 85–87 (2003). 
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enacted data protection laws to transpose the DPD.75  The DPEC supplements 
the DPD; the former applies to the processing of personal data in the electronic 
communications sector.76  The DPD refers to three main actors.  One is the 
“data subject” whose data is being collected by a “data controller.”77 A data 
controller is broadly defined under Article 2(d) DPD as a: 
Natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body 
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and 
means of processing are determined by national or Community laws 
or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his 
nomination may be designated by national or Community law.78 
The DPD also refers to a “data processor” as one who processes personal data 
on behalf of the data controller.79  The data processor’s role is limited by the 
data controller.80  A data processor is not limited to a person; the term may 
apply to a legal person, public authority, agency, or any other body which 
processes personal data as defined within Article 2(e) DPD.81  For example, 
company A compiles an online survey of Internet users for company B.  Under 
these circumstances, company A would be acting on behalf of company B. 
The following sections consider the application of the DPD and whether 
clickstream data constitutes “personal data” within the DPD.  The relevant 
provisions are Article 4(1)(c) and Article 2(b) of the DPD, which provide for 
the application of the DPD and the notion of personal data, respectively. 
1. Application 
The application of the DPD is contained within Article 4, which is 
comprised of three parts.82  Article 4(1)(c) is most relevant here, providing 
that: 
The controller is not established on Community territory and, for 
purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, 
 
 
75
 PRIVIREAL, Data Protection-Country Laws, http://www.privireal.org/content/dp/countries.php (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
 
76
 See generally DPEC, supra note 4. 
 
77
 DPD, supra note 3, art. 2. 
 
78
 Id. 
 
79
 Id. 
 
80
 See id. 
 
81
 Id. 
 
82
 Id. art. 4. 
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automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member 
State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit 
through the territory of the Community.83 
The Article 29 Working Party has taken the view that spyware and cookies 
may constitute “equipment” within the terms of Article 4(1)(c).84  The words 
“make use of” are to be construed as “to determine,” whereby the data 
controller determines how the equipment is used.85  Therefore, it is possible 
that a non-EEA data controller could fall within the scope of the DPD if it uses 
software within a Member State to record clicktrails of users.86  For example, a 
U.S. based company could be subject to the DPD if it uses monitoring software 
in France to record the websites visited by French citizens.  How this provision 
is enforced against non-EEA data controllers is another matter, but Article 
4(1)(c) can nevertheless reach beyond the EEA and apply to non-EEA data 
controllers.87  Companies outside of the EEA using “equipment” as defined 
within Article 4(1)(c) of the DPD should therefore be cautious about the types 
of personal information they collect to ensure that they operate within the 
DPD, even if they are not established in any of the EU Member States.88   
Another point to add is that clickstream data is most likely to be used by 
data mining industries and Internet companies.89  If clickstream data is being 
used to deliver customized services and advertisements to Internet users, then 
 
 
83
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
84
 See generally DOUWE KORFF, EC STUDY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: 
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF NATIONAL LAWS 43–51 (2002) (explaining the limits of “equipment” in Article 
4(1)(c)). 
 
85
 KUNER, supra note 74, at 98; see also Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data, Working Document on Determining the International Application of EU Data 
Protection Law to Personal Data Processing on the Internet by Non-EU Based Web Sites, 9–10, 
5035/01/EN/Final, WP 56 (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter Art. 29 Working Party: Internet], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp56_en.pdf (explaining the meaning and 
giving examples of “making use”). 
 
86
 See also Working Party on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data, Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Personal Data on the Internet 
Performed by Software and Hardware, 5093/98/EN/final, WP 17 (Feb. 23, 1999) [hereinafter 
Recommendation 1/99], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp17en. 
pdf.  “Clicktrails consist of information about an individual’s behaviour, identiy [sic], pathway or choices 
expressed while visiting a web site. They contain the links that a user has followed and are logged in the web 
server” Id. at 4; see generally KORFF, supra note 84.   
 
87
 See generally KUNER, supra note 74, at 97. 
 
88
 See DPD, supra note 3, art. 4(c). 
 
89
 See generally JIAWEI HAN & MICHELINE KAMBER, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 473–
75 (2001); Garrie, Legal Status, supra note 8; Balaji Rajagopalan & Ravi Krovi, Benchmarking Data Mining 
Algorithms, 13 J. DATABASE MGMT. 25 (2002) (finding that the amount of data collected by business is 
increasing). 
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the collection of such personal data would bring any company that is 
established in one or more of the Member States of the EU within the scope of 
the DPD.90  Even if the company is not established within the EU, Article 
4(1)(c) may still apply to companies outside the EEA that collect the 
clickstream data of their users.91  The purpose behind Article 4(1)(c) is to 
prevent data controllers from circumventing their responsibilities under the 
DPD by operating outside the EEA while using equipment within a Member 
State.92  For example, if company X is based in New York and has software in 
France that collects the clickstream data of its users, company X is making use 
of equipment93 within Article 4(1)(c) of the DPD.  Therefore, company X 
would be required to comply with the French data protection laws that 
correspond to the DPD. 
In short, the Article 29 Working Party does not rigidly interpret 
“equipment,” extending the definition to cookies, javascripts, and spyware.94 
2. Personal Data of an Individual 
The definition under Article 2(a) of the DPD broadly covers “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or 
more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural 
or social identity.”95 
 
 
90
 DPD, supra note 3, art. 4. 
 
91
 Id. 
 
92
 See generally KUNER, supra note 74, at 95–104 (giving an overview of the background of Article 
4(1)(c) of the DPD). 
 
93
 For a detailed analysis of the subject of “equipment,” see id. at 94–105. 
 
94
 See also European Commission. Status of implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/ 
privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). 
 
95
 DPD, supra note 3, art. 2 (emphasis added).  Recital 26 of the DPD adopts a broad criterion for 
identifiability, providing that “to determine whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the 
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person.”  
Id. pmbl., para. 26.  Recommendation R(89) 2 on the Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment 
Purposes also provides that “[a]n individual shall not be regarded as ‘identifiable’ if the identification requires 
an unreasonable amount of time, cost and manpower.”  Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, On the 
Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes, § 1.3, Recommendation No. R (89) 2 (Jan. 18, 
1989), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/data_protection/documents/ 
international_legal_instruments/Rec(89)2_EN.pdf.  For an in-depth analysis of the notions of “identification” 
and “identifiability,” see BYGRAVE, supra note 2, at 42–50. 
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The question about whether clickstream data is “personal data” within the 
meaning of Article 2(a) DPD is important for various reasons.  First, if 
clickstream data is “personal data,” then the DPD would obviously apply.96  
This scenario would require any company established within a Member State 
of the EU to comply with the relevant national data protection laws.97  
However, the question is also important because of its application to non-EEA 
data controllers.98  The collection of clickstream data is not restricted within 
EU borders and it is possible that non-EEA data controllers could again be 
brought within the scope of the DPD. 
As elucidated above, clickstream data can be extracted from personal 
information such as static IP addresses, cookies, and webpages viewed by 
individuals.99  Already, some data protection authorities in Germany100 and 
Sweden101 have taken the view that static IP addresses constitute personal data 
within their country’s data protection laws.  The question that arises is what are 
the implications of such a view for companies whether based within or outside 
the EU?102  For companies based within the EU, the relevant EU Member State 
data protection law applies, depending on where the company is established.103  
For example, a company based in the United Kingdom would be required to 
comply with the UK Data Protection Act of 1998.104  With regard to a 
company based outside the EU, one must determine whether the company uses 
“equipment” within the meaning of Article 4(1)(c) of the DPD to collect IP 
addresses of users in the EU.105  Any non-EEA organization or company that 
makes use of software within a EU Member State to collect IP addresses of 
European users would be required to adhere to the relevant Member State data 
 
 
96
 DPD, supra note 3, art. 2. 
 
97
 Id. art. 4. 
 
98
 See KUNER, supra note 74, at 94. 
 
99
 See infra Part II. 
 
100
 See Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Sept. 14, 1994, BGB1. I at 
S.2325, § 3, (F.R.G.), translation available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_029/nn_535764/EN/ 
DataProtectionActs/DataProtectionActs__node.html__nnn=true.  The Act defines “personal data” as “any 
information concerning the personal or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable individual.”  Id.  
The Federal Data Protection Commissioner shares the same view as the Article 29 Working Party that IP 
addresses are personal data.  Email Interview with Ms Jennen, Federal Data Protection Commissioners (May 
2, 2005). 
 
101
 See 3 § Personuppgiftslagen (Svenska författningssamling [SFS] 1998:204) (Swed.), translation 
available at http://www.datainspektionen.se/pdf/ovright/pul-end.pdf.  The Act defines “personal data” as “all 
kinds of information that directly or indirectly may be referable to a natural person who is alive.”  Id. 
 
102
 For an in-depth discussion of Article 4(1) of the DPD, see KUNER, supra note 74, at 94–105. 
 
103
 See id. 
 
104
 See Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 5 (U.K.).   
 
105
 DPD, supra note 3, art. 4. 
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protection laws.106  For example, if a company based in India uses software in 
France to collect IP addresses of European users, then the French data 
protection laws would apply.  In short, Article 4(1)(c) of the DPD applies to 
any company outside the EU that makes use of the equipment within a 
Member State.107 
The next question is how one determines whether clickstream data is 
personal data.  Article 2(a) of the DPD provides some guidance.108  The key is 
whether clickstream data relates to an identified or identifiable individual.  If 
clickstream data cannot relate to an identified or identifiable person, then the 
data arguably falls outside the scope of the DPD.109  However, if clickstream 
data pertains to or facilitates the identification of a specific individual, then the 
DPD would apply.110  This interpretation would require the organization, as the 
data controller, to comply with the data protection principles as laid down 
under Article 6(1) or its corresponding provision and the laws of the relevant 
Member State.111 
The preamble to the DPD provides some assistance on the interpretation of 
personal data.112  The relevant provision is Recital 26, which provides that: 
Whereas the principles of protection must apply to any information 
concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to determine 
whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the 
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any 
other person to identify the said person; whereas the principles of 
protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way 
that the data subject is no longer identifiable . . . .113 
The DPD does not apply to data that is in anonymous form because no single 
individual can be identified.114  Data in anonymous form prevents anyone from 
ascertaining that the data in question relates to an identified or identifiable 
individual.115 
 
 
106
 See KUNER, supra note 74, at 94–105. 
 
107
 See DPD, supra note 3, art. 4. 
 
108
 Id. art. 2. 
 
109
 Id. 
 
110
 See id. 
 
111
 Id. art. 6. 
 
112
 Id. pmbl., para. 26. 
 
113
 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
114
 See Privacy in Research Ethics & Law, Recommendations Around Anonymisation and the Definition 
of Personal Data, http://www.privireal.org/content/recommendations/#Recc (last visited on Oct. 19, 2006). 
 
115
 See id. (providing an in-depth analysis of anonymisation). 
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The discussion about clickstream data as personal data is not entirely 
conclusive.  On the one hand, the Article 29 Working Party takes the view that 
clickstream data qualifies as personal data under the DPD in most instances.116  
For example, the collection of a user’s IP addresses and webpages visited 
qualifies as collecting personal information relating to an individual.  As early 
as 2000, the Article 29 Working Party identified that there was monitoring 
software available to ISPs that could be used to generate far more information 
about traffic patterns and content preferences.117  These include software such 
as Alexa, which is added to a browser and used to accompany the user while 
surfing.118  The information collected is then used to form a large database, 
which in turn measures Internet usage.119 
Reidenberg and Schwartz, however, take the view that “[for] on-line 
services, the determination of whether particular information relates to an 
‘identifiable person’ is unlikely to be straightforward.”120  While there may be 
difficulties in determining whether clickstream data correlates with a specific 
individual, the technologies have become so sophisticated that it is possible to 
extract personal information from clickstream data and identify specific 
individuals from this process.121  The next question is whether the DPD 
protects clickstream data belonging to a group of individuals. 
3. Personal Data Belonging to a Group of Individuals 
As the DPD is person-specific, it is unlikely that clickstream data 
belonging to a group of individuals will be protected.122  For example, if a 
computer was registered against a number of individuals through an IP 
address, then it is not personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) DPD 
because a single individual cannot be identified from such use.123  As Lee 
 
 
116
 See generally Recommendation 1/99, supra note 86, at 4 (explaining that cookies and javascript are 
personal data under the DPD). 
 
117
 See Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
Working Document: Privacy on the Internet—An Integrated EU Approach to On-Line Data Protection, 46, 
5063/00/EN/Final, WP 37 (Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/ 
wpdocs/2000/wp37en.pdf. 
 
118
 Id. 
 
119
 Id. 
 
120
 JOEL R. REIDENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND ONLINE SERVICES: 
REGULATORY RESPONSES 23 (1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/studies/ 
regul_en.pdf. 
 
121
 See Garrie, Legal Status, supra note 8, at 727. 
 
122
 See BYGRAVE, supra note 2, at 317. 
 
123
 See DPD supra note 3, art. 2. 
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Bygrave states: “The chance of an IP address (and other clickstream data 
registered against that address) constituting personal data will be diminished if 
a multiplicity of persons are registered against the address.”124 
Discussion over the extension of the DPD to legal entities is well 
documented.125  While a number of countries—Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
and, to a limited extent, Italy—have extended their own data protection laws to 
legal entities, the DPD does not protect clickstream data belonging to legal 
entities any more than it protects data belonging to a group of individuals.126 
4. Clickstream Data as Sensitive Data 
Assuming clickstream data is construed as “personal data,” the next 
question is whether clickstream data can ever be sensitive data.  Article 8(1) of 
the DPD categorizes sensitive data as “personal data revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”127  
Assuming that the clickstream data is person specific (i.e. relating to an 
identifiable individual), data revealing an individual’s ethnic origin or religious 
opinion would qualify as sensitive data.128  However, there is one flaw with 
this argument.  It is not always possible to draw an inference of an individual’s 
sensitive data based on the fact that he or she has visited a particular website.  
For example, if a user visited a Christian website, it is not necessarily true that 
the user was doing so for his or her religious beliefs rather than for research 
purposes.  Certainly, repeated visits to a particular website or websites of a 
similar nature may indicate that the user holds particular religious beliefs.  But 
it does not always follow that a website will necessarily correlate with a user’s 
sensitive data as defined under Article 8(1). 
The DPD does not draw a distinction in ascertaining the user’s intention 
when he or she visits a website.129  The current categorization of sensitive data 
 
 
124
 BYGRAVE, supra note 2, at 318. 
 
125
 For a detailed analysis into legal entities, see BYGRAVE, supra note  2, at 173–298 (analyzing data 
protection for legal entities), and DOUWE KORFF, STUDY ON THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS AND INTEREST OF 
LEGAL PERSONS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA RELATING TO SUCH PERSONS 22–41 
(1998) (outlining the treatment of legal entities in the Member States). 
 
126
 See id.  
 
127
 DPD, supra note 3, art. 8(1) (emphasis added). 
 
128
 See id. 
 
129
 See Rebecca Wong, Data Protection Online: Alternative Approaches to Sensitive Data?, 2(1) J. INT’L 
COM. L. & TECH. 9–16, available at http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/JICLT; see also Consultative Committee 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Report for the 
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is not adequate as it is based on the actual nature of the data.130  More 
specifically, the publication of any personal data on the Internet may, under 
particular contexts, constitute the processing of sensitive data.131  For example, 
a photograph showing the ethnic origin of the individual would be regarded as 
sensitive data irrespective of the context or purpose in which the photograph 
was published.132 
From a practical perspective, it would be difficult to correlate a user’s visit 
on a website with any of the data listed under Article 8(1) DPD.133  However, 
the key to understanding this provision is the word “revealing” under Article 
8(1).  If the European Court of Justice broadly interpreted “sensitive data” so 
that reference to an individual’s foot injury on a webpage would constitute the 
processing of sensitive data (as in Lindqvist),134 then it is possible to contend 
that an individual’s clickstream data could also be defined as sensitive data 
within Article 8(1) DPD.  Even if the correlation between the user and his or 
her clickstream data revealing sensitive data is weak, the DPD may 
nevertheless still apply.135  In other words, there is still the possibility that 
clickstream data of a single individual would qualify under Article 8(1) of the 
DPD as “sensitive data” notwithstanding the difficulties highlighted above. 
III.  DIRECTIVE ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 2002/58/EC 
The next issue is whether the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications 2002/58/EC covers clickstream data.  The DPEC applies to 
the processing of personal data in the electronic communications sector and 
complements the DPD.  Although it updates the Telecommunications Directive 
97/66/EC in dealing with various issues ranging from an opt-in consent of 
 
Committee of Ministers, app. 4, T-PD (2004) RAP 21 (April 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/data_protection/events/ t-pd_and_t-pd-bur_meetings/T-
PD%20_2005_%20RAP%2021%20E.pdf (referring to the current enumeration of sensitive data under Article 
8(1) DPD and making a number of recommendations). 
 
130
 See Wong, supra note 129. 
 
131
 See BYGRAVE, supra note 2, at 69 (commenting on the context approach and sensitive data); see 
generally Spiros Simitis, Revisiting Sensitive Data, http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/ 
data_protection/documents/reports_and_studies_by_experts/Z-Report_Simitis_1999.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 
2006) (discussing the context oriented approach to personal data as sensitive data).  
 
132
 The arguments on the current approach to sensitive data have been covered elsewhere. 
 
133
 See DPD, supra note 3, art. 8. 
 
134
 Case C-101/01, Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2002 E.C.R. I-12791, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 
(2002). 
 
135
 See DPD, supra note 3, art. 8. 
GARRIE & WONG GALLEYS.FINAL 3/29/2007  11:29:47 AM 
2006] DEMYSTIFYING CLICKSTREAM DATA 583 
unsolicited commercial communication to location data,136 the DPEC does not 
have a specific section dealing with clickstream data.137  It only considers 
specific devices such as cookies and spyware that intrude upon a user’s 
personal privacy.138  The relevant section is Article 5(3) of the DPEC, which 
provides: 
Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic 
communications networks to store information or to gain access to 
information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user 
is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is 
provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance 
with Directive 95/46/EC, inter alia about the purposes of the 
processing, and is offered the right to refuse such processing by the 
data controller.  This shall not prevent any technical storage or access 
for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission of 
a communication over an electronic communications network, or as 
strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service 
explicitly requested by the subscriber or user.139 
In short, users and subscribers should be provided with clear and 
comprehensive information about the use of such devices and have the right to 
object to such processing.140  This provision is a watered-down version from 
the original proposals to the DPEC that required an opt-in consent from users 
before such devices could be installed.  Article 5(3) should be considered in 
light of Recital 24 of the preamble of the DPEC, which states: 
Terminal equipment of users of electronic communications networks 
and any information stored on such equipment are part of the private 
sphere of the users requiring protection under the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.  So-called spyware, web bugs, hidden identifiers and other 
similar devices can enter the user’s terminal without their knowledge 
in order to gain access to information, to store hidden information or 
to trace the activities of the user and may seriously intrude upon the 
privacy of these users.  The use of such devices should be allowed 
only for legitimate purposes, with the knowledge of the users 
concerned.141 
 
 
136
 DPEC, supra note 4, pmbl., para. 4. 
 
137
 See generally id. 
 
138
 See id. pmbl., para. 25. 
 
139
 Id. art. 5. 
 
140
 See id. 
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 Id. pmbl., para. 24. 
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The main criticism is that under the DPEC there is no express reference to 
clickstream data.142  Article 5(3) is “device specific” by focusing on specific 
items that could be installed without a user’s knowledge.143  In the absence of a 
definition, a purposive interpretation should be adopted by looking at whether 
the devices in question intrude upon the privacy of the users.144  Clickstream 
data would be covered under the general DPD, but not so under the DPEC.  
Given that the DPEC is intended to apply to the processing of personal data in 
electronic communications,145 one can argue that there should be a specific 
section that expressly deals with clickstream data, rather than merely an update 
of the Telecommunications Directive 2002/58/EC.  Further discussion about 
DPEC and clickstream data is needed with data protection authorities and the 
Article 29 Working Party. 
IV.  U.S. LEGAL TREATMENT OF CLICKSTREAM DATA 
Unlike its European counterpart, the U.S. legal framework does not have to 
contend with a series of legal frameworks that specify the types of data.  While 
the U.S. courts have guidelines, it is determined on a case-by-case basis.  
Therefore, a great deal of the U.S. clickstream debate has been interpreted by 
the U.S. courts.146 
A. Treatment of Clickstream Data by U.S. Courts 
Unlike the European courts, the U.S. courts to date have not differentiated 
clickstream data further than by recognizing it as an exception to the Wiretap 
Act.  U.S. courts have achieved this differentiation by imputing that a visitor’s 
utilization of a web-portal constitutes consent to interception and manipulation 
of the user’s data, including but not limited to the data exchanged with that 
web-portal.147  The courts have found that this data can then be monitored and 
 
 
142
 See generally id. 
 
143
 See id. art. 5(3). 
 
144
 Compare DPD, supra note 3, with DPEC, supra note 4. 
 
145
 DPEC, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 
146
 See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2003); In re Toys R Us, Inc., 
Privacy Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16947 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. 
Supp. 2d 1153, 1155–57 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 
503–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Portions of Part IV have been substantially reprinted from Garrie, Voice Over, supra 
note 8, at 117–20. 
 
147
 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511 (“Although the users’ requests for data come through 
clicks, not keystrokes, they nonetheless are voluntary and purposeful. Therefore, because plaintiffs’ GET, 
GARRIE & WONG GALLEYS.FINAL 3/29/2007  11:29:47 AM 
2006] DEMYSTIFYING CLICKSTREAM DATA 585 
recorded by prying eyes and mined for information that can be used internally 
to construct a web user profile, recreate his or her online experience, sold to 
interested third-parties, or given to unknown third-parties for other unspecified 
reasons such as security.148 
While the U.S. courts have dealt with clickstream data in Chance,149 
Pharmatrak,150 Toys R Us,151 and DoubleClick,152 in which plaintiffs all 
alleged violations of the Wiretap Act through the use of cookie technology to 
intercept clickstream data,153  the outcome of each of these cases rested upon 
the Wiretap Act, and examinations of reasonable expectations of privacy under 
Katz’s two-part test were cursory at best.154  Recently, however, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Pharmatrak155 limited the effects of this judicial 
exception by stipulating that a user’s consent can be inferred only when there 
is actual notice and when one party actually consents to the interception.156  
While it is unlikely that this holding has benefited users, no empirical data 
exists on what influence any of the aforesaid holdings have had on the 
development of web-site monitoring technologies. 
 
POST and GIF submissions to DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites are all ‘intended for’ those Web sites, the Web 
sites’ authorization is sufficient to except  DoubleClick’s access under §  2701(c)(2).”). 
 
148
 See Usama M. Fayyad, Gregory Piatetsky-Shapiro & Padhraic Smyth, From Knowledge Discovery to 
Data Mining: An Overview, in ADVANCES IN KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 6–11 (1996); Tal Z. 
Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal 
Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 4, 11 (2002–2003). 
 
149
 See Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156–57. 
 
150
 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 16.  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act provides for a 
private right of action against one who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other 
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(1)(a) (2006). 
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 See In re Toys R Us, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16947 at *1. 
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 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503–04. 
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 See generally Daniel B. Garrie, Mathew J. Armstrong & Alan F. Blakley, Voice Over Internet 
Protocol: Reality v. Legal Fiction, 52 FED. LAW. 34, 34 (2005) (describing clickstream data and cookie 
technology). 
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 The Supreme Court has historically applied a two-part test to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment protects an asserted privacy interest.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J. concurring) (announcing a test to determine expectations of privacy).  First, the individual must 
exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy.  Id.  Second, the expectation must be “one that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”  Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(applying two-part test). 
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 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19–22. 
 
156
 Id. at 20 (“Without actual notice, consent can only be implied when the surrounding circumstances 
convincingly show that the party knew about and consented to the interception.” (quoting Berry v. Funk, 146 
F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir.1998))).  Moreover, “knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be 
considered implied consent.”  Id. (quoting Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
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1. Wiretap Act and Broad Judicial Interpretation of the Consent Exception. 
In dealing with clickstream data157 and cookie-related technology,158 a 
Second Circuit district court in DoubleClick159 construed the Wiretap Act’s 
consent exception broadly,160 requiring only implied consent, whereas the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Pharmatrak161 narrowly construed the exception, 
requiring actual consent.162  In both of these cases, the court heard Wiretap Act 
claims alleging unauthorized third party access to communications.163  In these 
cases, end-users conveyed digital information to second-party entities that then 
used the information to construct user profiles in a process referred to as data 
mining.164 
The implications of the distinction between implied and actual consent are 
important because the former interpretation of consent favors industry while 
the latter interpretation favors the user.  The users’ interests appear to be 
marginalized in DoubleClick.165  Although the court may not have found a 
violation of the users’ privacy rights in DoubleClick,166 a violation of privacy 
rights did arguably occur because the users did not truly consent to their 
clickstream data being extracted from their machines.  The court’s holding 
demonstrates that the threshold for establishing implied consent is significantly 
lower than that of showing actual consent for the user. 
The DoubleClick court permitted web businesses to intercept clickstream 
data utilizing cookie technology,167 thereby extracting personal information 
from users’ machines.168  The defendant web business placed cookies on end-
users’ computers, which then transmitted personal information back to the 
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 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 501–02. 
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 For a more in-depth analysis, see Garrie, Voice Over, supra note 8, at 117–20. 
 
159
 See In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d. at 501–02 (discussing cookies and the collection of data, 
where the plaintiffs again did not prevail). 
 
160
 See id. 
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 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19. 
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 See id. at 19–22. 
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 See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 12; In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
16947 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 
2001); In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507. 
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 In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 12; In re DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp. 2d at 503, 505; see  generally 
Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 105 (2000) (describing data mining). 
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website’s owner or to a third-party data mining company.169  Rather than find 
that there had been a violation of the users’ privacy rights,170 the court found 
that the web business’s unilateral consent was sufficient to authorize third-
party usurpation of the users’ personal information using cookie technology.171  
The court held that the third-party data mining companies did not violate the 
Wiretap Act under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) because the users had given implied 
consent and because their actions were not conducted for tortious or illegal 
purposes.172 
2. Wiretap Act and Judicial Interpretation Distinguishing Inferred Consent 
from General Consent. 
By contrast, the court in Pharmatrak173 challenged the sweeping 
implications of the implied consent argument established in DoubleClick174 by 
requiring that the party both know about and consent to the interceptions 
before consent can be inferred.175  The court in Pharmatrak found in favor of 
the Internet users, holding that neither party to the communication consented to 
the web-monitoring company’s interception of personally identifiable 
information.176  The court reasoned that “without actual notice, consent can 
only be implied when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show that 
the party knew about and consented to the interception.”177  Because the parties 
had an explicit contract limiting the permissible scope of the interception to 
non-personally identifiable data,178 the court refused to find implied consent 
between the parties to collect personally-identifiable information that clearly 
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 See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 19–22 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 
174
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when the surrounding circumstances convincingly show that the party knew about and consented to the 
interception” (quoting Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).  Moreover, “knowledge of the 
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 See id. at 19–22. 
 
177
 See id. at 20. 
 
178
 See id. at 15. 
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exceeded the bounds of the express contract.179  The Pharmatrak180 
requirement of actual consent represents a stricter stance on inferring consent 
than was taken in DoubleClick.181  However, even under this construction, end-
users never input all of the written information transmitted by cookie via 
clickstream technology over the Internet; thus, the courts have imputed consent 
by reasoning that end-users and their computers are the same entity. 
By limiting the court’s ability to infer consent to situations in which actual 
consent has been obtained,182 the Pharmatrak holding took a major step 
towards eliminating the judicially created pseudo-exception for clickstream 
data under the Wiretap Act.183 
B. Conclusion Concerning U.S. Law 
Clickstream data still presents novel challenges to the U.S. legal system 
and the law surrounding clickstream data is likely to evolve.  Although the 
U.S. courts have addressed specific situations of consent and privacy of the 
user, the digital privacy landscape remains convoluted and complex.184  
Moreover, the state of the law today seems to fall notably short of protecting 
the consumer. However, if the trend established in Pharmatrak continues, 
courts may eliminate the clickstream data exception on their own by requiring 
either explicit or implicit actual consent for all third-party clickstream data 
interceptions under the Wiretap Act, including those data sent by end-users’ 
machines without any end-user input.  Although European law is not perfect, it 
provides some specificity as to acceptable and unacceptable collection of 
clickstream data, thereby providing more effective and stronger consumer 
protections than those provided by the U.S. legal structure. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is two-fold.  First, it is to raise the level of 
discussion amongst data protection authorities, legislators, and internet 
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companies about the overall regulation of clickstream data within Europe and 
the United States.  Second, the Article draws on specific problems relating to 
the scope of clickstream data as covered under the European Data Protection 
framework and the U.S. legal framework.  The Data Protection Framework is a 
starting point, but the regulation and application is not restricted within 
Europe. 
In the United States, such protections are in their infancy because the U.S. 
legislature has failed to create any substantive uniform protection for a global 
data protection framework.  Of course, in the Untied States, independent states 
create data protection laws, but these laws have not been treated by the state 
courts.  As demonstrated by the cases DoubleClick and Pharmatrak, federal 
judicial interpretations of consent to clickstream data are inconsistent.  
Furthermore, users’ interests were marginalized in DoubleClick.  In contrast, 
the decision in Pharmatrak is a step towards the right direction in recognizing 
the rights of Internet users. 
Given the potential ways in which clickstream data can be used, be it in the 
United States or Europe, companies should be aware of the DPD, while users 
and consumers should be made more aware of clickstream data and how it is 
used.  Additionally, DPEC is not without its shortcomings and certainly more 
needs to be done to raise the issue at a European level with both the Article 29 
Working Party and data protection authorities. 
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